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Cameroon's Election Casts a Long Shadow
Cameroonians just reelected the 92-year-old Paul Biya
in an election that voters rightly view with suspicion. The tensions under the surface don't bode
well for the country or its people.
By Christopher Fomunyoh
November 2025
On 12 October 2025, the Central African country of Cameroon held a presidential election, the outcome of
which now pushes its more than thirty-million inhabitants toward wide-scale violence and contestation,
extreme polarization, and a potential long-term dislocation of the state. The race turned out to be more
hotly contested than some observers had expected - especially ruling-party elites, some of whom have
been at the helm of Cameroonian politics since the country gained independence in 1960. But in the end,
92-year-old Paul Biya, who has been president since 1982, was once again proclaimed the winner.
Although a sizeable number of Cameroon's eight-million-plus registered voters cast ballots peacefully on
election day, the vote-tabulation process gave rise to suspicions that vote totals had been tampered
with or manipulated to favor Biya to the detriment of his main competitor and former government
minister, Issa Tchiroma. That it took the Constitutional Council the full fifteen days allowed by the
country's election law to officially pronounce the results added to Cameroonians' anxiety and to
suspicions of electoral fraud. The multiple layers of vote aggregation adopted decades ago -
polling-station tallies are transmitted up through three separate commissions before they finally reach
the Constitutional Council for validation and declaration of the winner - appear totally archaic in this
age of modern technology that, in other countries, allows for rapid and real-time transmission of
election data.
Elections are a cornerstone of governance whose conduct provides a window into the vitality of the other
pillars, such as state-society relations, the separation of powers, and functionality of legislatures,
judiciaries, and independent entities including political parties, security services, and civil society.
The conduct of this year's polls and handling of the postelection crisis exposed undeniable flaws and
weaknesses in Cameroonian society, and are tearing through the veil of cosmetic democratic
experimentation that the current regime has shielded itself with for more than four decades.
Unfortunately, citizens' current suspicions are warranted because of controversies around previous
presidential polls - notably, in 1992 and 2018, when opposition parties claimed victory at the ballot
box, though their claims lacked hard proof. Learning from those experiences, today's opposition parties
and civil society set up various platforms to independently collate and tabulate election results across
the country, based on tally sheets, and publicly announced vote totals from polling sites.
The controversy at hand is that the figures put forward by the opposition and civil society show a clear
victory for Tchiroma, in sharp contrast to the Constitutional Council's official pronouncement which
ruling-party members and staunch Biya supporters have embraced. The stakes are high, the binary choice
is stark, and tensions are already at a fever pitch in a country whose diversity comprises other fault
lines that can easily be exacerbated by political and election-related conflict. For many Cameroonians
and keen observers of the country's politics, the swearing-in of Paul Biya on November 6 was the epitome
of a pyrrhic victory, a missed opportunity for the peaceful transfer of power and yet another harbinger
of real challenges to come.
Elections, Parties, the Gerontocracy, and the People
Cameroon's current electoral framework dates back to 2012. The election-management body, ELECAM, was
created a decade earlier, in 2006, and hasn't undertaken much procedural change or adopted innovations
to match today's global technological advancements. Citizens at the universally accepted majority age of
18 are deprived of the right to vote until they are 20 years old - an anomaly artificially built into
the system to discourage youth engagement and participation. Paradoxically, Cameroon is currently
governed by leaders in their 90s, while the median age in the country is 19.
Even basic electoral processes such as voter registration and voter-card distribution are cumbersome and
highly regimented. Unlike in other African countries, the transmittal of election results is subjected
to three layers of collation at the local, divisional, and national levels prior to their transmittal to
the Constitutional Council by ELECAM. In contrast, neighboring Nigeria - a country with more than
ninety-million registered voters - has adopted technological innovations that considerably speed up and
safeguard the electronic management of election results: Polling-station results are instantaneously
recorded and transmitted directly and immediately to the national data center.
The October 2025 polls also underscored the fragility of Cameroonian political parties which, even in
ordinary times, are at permanent risk of suffocation by an overbearing state and administrative
apparatus that shrinks political space daily. Outside of campaign season, the state allows little room
or freedom for political parties to operate. The country's notorious central prison in the capital city
of Yaoundé is filled with political leaders and activists who were arrested while advocating for
rights and liberties that fall squarely within the definition of regular political activities.
Additionally, the election law limits the campaign period to just fifteen days, which does not give
parties enough time to present platforms and engage in meaningful conversations with citizens and voters
across a country with limited transportation infrastructure. No wonder that in the two-week period
leading up to October 12, candidates crisscrossed the regions of Cameroon, holding rallies where they
made many promises without any substantive input from voters on the professed platforms. The country
could not even hold a debate among the presidential candidates - now commonplace in many African
countries - because of time constraints.
Given these circumstances, the October election quickly became a referendum on personalities: The
electorate essentially had to choose between the long-ruling nonagenarian Biya and his closest rival,
the 76-year-old Tchiroma. Although there were ten other candidates, two of whom are not yet 40 years
old, they stood little chance of success, having been nominated by small parties with neither the
resources nor the name recognition or national reach to be competitive. Moreover, the continued
domination of the country's leadership by elderly politicians has stifled the interest and motivation of
young political aspirants to run for office. Making matters worse, the Constitutional Council's
controversial decision to eliminate one of the main opposition candidates - 71-year-old Maurice Kamto,
who had a broad base of supporters - tainted the credibility of the process.
One of the few silver linings of this election was the emergence of a determined electorate and civil
society that, despite open threats of arrest and prosecution from cabinet ministers, courageously found
ways to assert themselves in recruiting, training, and deploying thousands of citizen observers to
monitor the vote for greater transparency and accountability. These civic groups also raised awareness
about the need to protect and defend the people's votes. Many of these civic networks remained engaged
during the immediate postelection period - sharing their findings and galvanizing citizens to advocate
for truth and transparency with regard to the election outcome. There is still hope that the civic
leaders and activists who monitored the polls and helped raise public awareness could go on to become
the incubators of much-needed electoral and political reforms. Tragically, however, some of those
activists lost their lives in the countrywide demonstrations that followed the announcement of Biya's
reelection, and hundreds more were arrested.
A Dark Forecast
The story of Cameroon's 2025 presidential election is not over. We may still see twists and turns in the
months ahead, as grievances around the conduct of the poll continue to swell. The sloppy, corrupt
handling of the vote has put the country's future in jeopardy, especially as millions of Cameroonians
continue to contest the outcome and aspire to greater freedoms, more accountability, and genuine
democracy - the likes of which have not been seen during this regime's 43-year reign. The country is
already fragile and divided by an armed conflict, now in its eighth year, in its English-speaking
regions, which Biya has failed to resolve and Tchiroma pledges to prioritize should he become president.
Additionally, the country has been subjected to frequent incursions by Boko Haram and other Islamist
extremist movements operating in northeastern Nigeria and the Lake Chad basin, which share a long and
porous border with northern regions of Cameroon. Those regions are Tchiroma's strongholds, and they are
among the most disaffected with the poor governance of the past four decades. To Tchijroma's credit, and
fortunately for the country, he was able to expand that base of support such that his victory, as
currently projected by his supporters and most of civil society, was nationwide - including in major
cities and urban areas in other parts of the country. This new projection of Tchiroma as a national
figure makes it even more difficult for the current regime to survive the perception of a victory stolen
by the more clannish and divisive leader that Biya has become.
Cameroon's attachment to freedom and democracy also has significant bearings on the future of all of
Central Africa, where smaller and more fragile countries such as Chad, the Central Africa Republic,
Congo-Brazzaville, Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon rely on peace and stability in the hegemon that Cameroon
represents for them. Cameroonians, and Africans more broadly, fear the possible fallout from
election-related disputes - such as the postelection violence that claimed thousands of lives in Kenya
in 2008 and Côte d'Ivoire in 2010, or the military coups that followed failed or contested
elections in Gabon, Guinea, and Mali in recent years.
The tragedy for Cameroon is that many citizens see through the electoral shenanigans and manipulation of
unscrupulous political hacks and misguided elites, but feel a sense of helplessness. At this critical
moment in Cameroon's history, it does not augur well that the sitting president - the world's oldest -
is fast losing the battle for legitimacy in the eyes of millions of Cameroonians and is visibly too
feeble and disconnected to fully apprehend the danger of a total flagellation of the already fragile
nation. At the same time, the African Union and other continental entities are unable to call a spade by
its name or engage in proactive preventive diplomacy amid other major crises on the continent and
elsewhere. As I was reminded the other day by a democracy activist from another part of Africa, "We have
watched movies like this before; and they almost never end well."
Christopher Fomunyoh is senior associate for Africa and special advisor to the president at
the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), a U.S.-based nonprofit
organization that works to support and strengthen freedom and democracy worldwide.
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